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International NGOs, the Arab Upheaval, and
Human Rights: Examining NGO Resource
Allocation
Gerald M. Steinberg*
“HRW blurs the boundaries between support for governments and human
rights advocacy. The classic work of human rights organizations is to
press governments on human rights issues, not drum up support for
specific regimes.” 1
—Gita Sahgal, head of Amnesty International’s Gender Unit until
2010
¶1

¶2

¶3

¶4

When the unprecedented protests began in the Middle East (termed variously as the
Arab spring, turmoil, upheaval, etc.), human rights issues were featured prominently.
Journalists and social media reports emphasized demands to end the practices of the
closed and totalitarian regimes that had controlled these societies and their populations
for decades in countries like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. In their
statements and interviews, protest leaders and participants highlighted democracy and
human rights as major objectives.
However, by the end of 2011, after the toppling of some regimes and amidst the
ongoing conflict in others, the hopes for significant and lasting human rights reforms in
these countries and in the regions had receded. In Tunisian and Egyptian elections, the
parties that received the greatest support were not associated with a strong commitment
to the universal principles of human rights. The same situation exists in Libya and
Yemen, where the post-dictatorship political systems are even more uncertain. The
language of human rights in the discourse of the Arab revolutions had all but
disappeared.
In this paper, we will explore some of the factors that have contributed to this
disappointing outcome. We note that political, religious and cultural factors are likely to
have been instrumental. However, the international structures and institutions most
closely associated with promoting universal human rights also share responsibility for the
failure to realize these values. In order to reverse the current situation, a sustained and
principled engagement with powerful frameworks is necessary.
These institutions include the United Nations—particularly the UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR)—as well as the numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have
*

Professor of Political Science, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance and suggestions provided by Gidon Shaviv, Anne Herzberg, and Joshua
Bacon.
1 Women and Islam: A Debate with Human Rights Watch, NYRBLOG (Feb 23, 2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/23/women-islam-debate-human-rights-watch.
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worked closely with the UNHRC. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and
its allies have been a major determinant to the agenda and activities of the UNHRC (until
2006, the UN Commission for Human Rights), consistently blocking any discussion of
their own systematic human rights violations.2
In parallel, the publications, activities and campaigns of the international NGOs
claiming a central role in promoting human rights reflect a similar failure to focus
significant resources in building support in Arab societies. As will be illustrated in the
following analysis of Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and Amnesty International (the two
international human rights NGOs with the largest budgets and corresponding visibility),
for many years, these NGOs had devoted relatively limited resources and attention to
systematic violations in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, among
others. In the case of Libya, HRW and Amnesty actively promoted the regime, justified
as necessary in order to further human rights objectives. In 2011, when the situation
changed, the major increase in emphasis on these countries came too late to mitigate the
years of neglect.
The protests that led to the revolutions against closed military and dictatorial
regimes, beginning in Tunisia in January 2011 with the overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben
Ali, extending to the Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo and forced resignation of
Hosni Mubarak, the ouster of the Gaddafi family in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in
Yemen, cannot be attributed to NGO activities. 3 These groups often did not have the
resources required to report on human rights developments and violations during the
course of the revolutions. As HRW’s special advisor Fred Abrahams acknowledged,
“The west of Libya is a black hole . . . we have no idea what’s going on.”4 Similarly, on
June 7, 2011, HRW Executive Director Kenneth Roth used his Twitter account to repeat
a widely circulated tale of a Syrian blogger who had allegedly been “kidnapped by armed
men. Had written on uprising, politics, being a lesbian.”5 This was revealed to be a hoax,
and highlighted difficulty NGOs have in verifying claims and refuting unfounded
rumors.6
This article applies a quantitative summary of HRW’s and Amnesty’s activities in
the regions between 2005 and 2010 to measure and represent international NGOs’ focus
on the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) regions. We will show that with the
exception of Egypt, the countries involved in the Arab Spring were very low priorities for
HRW, and, on this basis, suggest that this relative neglect contributed significantly to the
absence of a foundation on which to build a human rights constituency. We will also
examine the factors that lead NGOs in general, and HRW (and to a lesser case Amnesty)
2 Don A. Habibi, Human Rights and Politicized Human Rights: A Utilitarian Critique, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 3, 9
(2007).
3 Revelations from U.S. State Department memos published by Wikileaks showed the State Department’s
widespread opinion of corruption in Yemen, which were ascribed a leading role in fueling the Tunisian
uprising. See Maha Azzam, Opinion: How WikiLeaks helped fuel Tunisian revolution, CNN (Jan. 18,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/opinion/tunisia.wikileaks_1_tunisians-wikileaksregime?_s=PM:OPINION.
4 James Downie, Why Isn’t There An Accurate Death Count In Libya?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/86090/libya-death-toll-war-qadaffi.
5 Ken Roth, Twitter (Jun. 7, 2011 12:35 am EST), https://twitter.com/KenRoth/status/78002087052582912
6 Melissa Bell & Elizabeth Flock, “A Gay Girl in Damascus” comes clean, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun.
12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/a-gay-girl-in-damascus-comesclean/2011/06/12/AGkyH0RH_story.html.
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in particular, to consistently devote fewer resources to human rights in closed societies
when compared to their activities and investment in open and democratic countries.
Three explanations (not mutually exclusive) will be suggested to explain this
behavior: 1) NGOs’ strategy and agenda are largely determined by media considerations,
so that issues that were difficult to access and had low media profiles were neglected; 2)
NGOs sought to avoid friction with Arab dictatorships in order to secure their
cooperation in seeking to improve human rights practices; and 3) agenda is influenced by
post-colonial political and ideological biases, which emphasize allegations against
Western democratic societies and ignores others.
I. IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

¶9

NGOs (non-governmental organizations) or CSOs (civil society organizations)
have become important actors in the “soft power” arena. In the United Nations system as
of 2007, over four thousand NGOs are accredited to the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC),7 giving them privileged access to many UN activities, including meetings of
the Human Rights Council (HRC),8 the 2001 World Conference on Racism (also known
as the Durban Conference),9 and special frameworks such as the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination10 and the Committee Against Torture. NGO
officials speak at some UN sessions, meet with participating diplomats, and submit
documents that are quoted in final reports.11 Similarly, diplomats, journalists, academics,
and other decision-makers and opinion leaders routinely quote NGO claims.
¶10
NGOs, both individually and through wider “transnational advocacy networks” or
“global civil society” frameworks, are particularly influential in issues related to human
rights and international law. Their moral claims are a major source of this influence, as
reflected in Chandler’s reference to NGOs as “[o]riented around universal beliefs and
motivations.”12 Similarly, Keck and Sikkink argue that while “[g]overnments are the
primary guarantors of rights, they are also their primary violators,” leaving individuals or
minorities with “[n]o recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas.” On this basis,
domestic NGOs are able to “[b]ypass their state and directly search out international
allies to bring pressure on their states from the outside.”13 Despite their uncontested
influence, NGOs constitute an unregulated and nebulous sector described as “fuzzy at the
edges.”14

7

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], List of non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council as of 17 October 2007, U.N. Doc. E/2007/INF/4 (Oct 17, 2007).
8 U.N. Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.
9 United Nations, Durban Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (Sep. 8, 2001), http://www.undocuments.net/durban-d.htm
10 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/.
11 RICHARD A. HIGGOTT, GEOFFREY R. UNDERHILL & ANDREAS B IELER, NON-STATE ACTORS AND
AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1999).
12 DAVID CHANDLER, CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MORALITY AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1 (2004).
13 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 12 (1998).
14 CHANDLER, supra note 12, ¶ 1.
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In examining the objectives and activities of human rights NGOs, the academic
literature suggests four specific activities and indicators: 1) agenda setting; 2) creating
norms or promoting policy changes; 3) building networks and coalitions in the target
countries and regions; and 4) implementing solutions through “tactics of persuasion and
pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms.”15
¶12
The objectives are consistent with the stated aims of HRW, which grew out of
“Helsinki Watch,”16 founded in the 1970s as a research-oriented alternative to Amnesty
International.17 HRW became one of the major international NGOs focusing on human
rights issues, with an annual budget of approximately fifty million dollars and a
worldwide reach. Over the years, they were joined by many other organizations based in
Europe and other parts of the world which promoted human rights agendas in the national
and international venues. In Blitt’s words, NGOs “[i]dentify their primary goals as
monitoring and reporting of government behavior on human rights . . . building pressure
and creating international machinery to end the violations and to hold governments
accountable.”18 Due to their strong emphasis on research, their importance in the NGO
community, and their global reach, global NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty provide
appropriate case studies for examining allocation of resources and attention to different
regions and issues.
¶13
In gaining influence, NGOs present images of being “above politics and ideology,”
without interests or power considerations. Willet states that, “[t]here is a widespread
attitude that NGOs consist of altruistic people campaigning in the general public interest,
while governments consist of self-serving politicians . . . such an attitude should not be
adopted as an unchallenged assumption . . .”19 Blitt demonstrates the degree to which
NGOs that deal with human rights elicit “[i]nstinctive support amongst the general
public,”20 and Heins examines the processes by which NGOs create “symbolic” victims
while presenting themselves as altruistic rescuers.21
¶14
Following this pattern, in the Arab protests of 2011, international NGOs repeated
and magnified the human rights demands of many demonstrators and highlighted
reported violations, particularly by the regimes. Outside of the region, the mass media
gave prominence to NGO statements and reports. However, within the Arab societies in
which these demonstrations and revolutions took place, the impact of NGOs such as
HRW and Amnesty was minimal, reflecting the lack of investment in an infrastructure to
promote these principles, as detailed below.22 The lack of consistent NGO prioritization
15 Richard Price, Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics, 55 WORLD POLITICS 579,
584 (2003).
16 Our History, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/75134.
17 Michael Minch, Human Rights Watch, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 500 (Deen K. Chatterjee
ed., 2011).
18 Robert Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?: International Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 261, 288 (2007).
19 PETER WILLETTS, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD 11 (1996).
20 Blitt, supra note 18, at 263.
21 VOLKER HEINS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: STRUGGLES OVER
RECOGNITION 24 (2008).
22 On the general difficulty of measuring humanitarian NGO impact on state practice, see D. L. Cingranelli
& D. L. Richards, Measuring the Impact of Human Rights Organizations, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE, (Claude E. Welch ed., 2000). For the effectiveness humanitarian NGO
strategy, see Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess
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in the allocation of resources and activities may have been an important factor in the
failure to sustain the human rights agenda as the Arab revolutions proceeded.
II. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ASSESSING PRIORITIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS
¶15

¶16

¶17

¶18

¶19

In contrast to the growth of international human rights NGOs and the attention that
they receive, there have been very few systematic efforts to assess the means by which
these organizations select priorities, allocate resources, and the degree to which these
decisions are reflected in impact. The use of case studies to analyze the roles and impact
of human rights NGOs on developments in the Arab revolutions that began in 2011
requires an assessment of available methodologies and their relative limitations and
strengths.
In assessing the comparative resources devoted by an NGO to specific countries,
the main measure is the number and type of publications focused on each case, as well as
visits made and reported by the NGO. While both HRW and Amnesty have produced a
high volume of publications in different forms on human rights and related issues in the
context of the Arab revolutions, there are some important differences in their structures
and outputs. HRW has a highly centralized framework, with strong emphasis on
research,23 while Amnesty, although comparable in terms of international scope, is highly
decentralized, and focuses on advocacy as well as on research.24 Amnesty’s most prolific
format, “urgent action items” are basically one page alerts to their members calling for
advocacy action. Urgent action items require few resources to produce and are often
repeated on the same issue, making them relatively weak indicators of the organization’s
allocation of resources. Additionally urgent action items are targeted at Amnesty’s
member base and not the media or the public at large. Such items are a good indicator of
Amnesty’s ongoing focus on prisoners of conscience.25
As a result of these differences, by using quantitative measures for assessing the
focus, priorities, and impact of NGOs across issues, and comparing the result to
independent indices of the relative human rights standings in each country, the
quantitative evaluation of Amnesty’s comparative activities across different countries
involves different functions and hence necessitates more interpretation than is the case
with HRW.
In the following analysis, documents published by HRW were assigned to the
different country categories based on their classification on HRW’s website. Broad multicountry publications were included in the country tally when a chapter or section was
devoted to that country. Countries mentioned briefly in a small number of reports that
surveyed global behavior on a specific topic such as human trafficking were not added to
the country total.
The comparative analysis of Amnesty’s publications by country focus applies the
same methodology, taking into account the two different categories of documents. The
the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2012); James C. Franklin, Shame on You: The
Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187 (2008).
23 Minch, supra note 17.
24 STEPHEN HOPGOOD, KEEPERS OF THE FLAME: UNDERSTANDING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 127-131
(2006).
25 Id. at 81.
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first category parallels HRW’s output and includes reports, press releases and other items
(including newsletters and artwork). Unlike HRW, however, Amnesty also issues many
urgent action items which are listed as a separate category. A summary of all Amnesty
documents in both categories appears in Table 1B.
HRW’s and Amnesty’s de facto country priorities, as seen through the comparative
extent of publications in each case, were then compared with the Freedom House index
based on “The Freedom in the World Survey” covering the years 2005-2011.26 When a
state’s Freedom House score reflects an open society, the expectation is that the number
of publications by each NGO respectively would be relatively lower.
Freedom House, a U.S.-based non-partisan NGO funded primarily by the U.S.
government, publishes an annual ranking and report (Freedom in the World) based on a
consistent and transparent methodology to compare the status of political freedoms and
civil liberties in 194 individual countries. This methodology relies on assessments of
“experts” to grade each country according to a fixed list of questions and criteria, making
the outcome somewhat dependent on the nature of the criteria, the choice of experts, and
their individual perceptions. While a number of critical studies of this methodology have
been published regarding the potential for systematic ideological biases,27 the findings
generally support the claim that the relative rankings are consistent and can be duplicated
independently.28 In contrast, groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International do not provide any methodological guidelines or information to explain
their priorities.
The Freedom House comparative index seeks to operationalize and measure
freedom via two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties using a checklist
containing ten political rights and fifteen civil liberties questions. Together, these
measures, as reported on each society, are deemed to reflect “the opportunity to act
spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other
centers of potential domination.”29 Analysts score each country using these questions,
and the report is reviewed individually and on a cross regional basis by analysts,
academic advisors with expertise in each region, and Freedom House staff. Each country
is then given numerical ratings on a scale of one to seven for political rights and for civil
liberties; a rating of one indicates the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest
level of freedom.30
While there are other indices used to compare the state of human rights in different
countries, such as the Political Terror Scale (PTS)31 and the Cingranelli and Richards
26

Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2011, FREEDOM HOUSE (2012)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIWAllScoresCountries1973-2011.xls.
27 Adam Przeworski, Freedom to Choose and Democracy, 19 ECON. & PHIL. 265, 277 (2003); Scott
Mainwaring, Daniel Brink & Anibal Perez-Linan, Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 19451999, 36 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 37, 53-55 (2001).
28 Raymond D. Gastil, The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions, 25 STUD. INT’L
COMP. DEV. 25, 41 (1990); Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An
Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, 8 H. R. Q. 567, 586 (1986); Kenneth A Bollen &
Pamela Paxton, Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 58 (2000).
29 Freedom in the World 2012: Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology.
30 See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 25.
31 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, & Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976-2006 (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.
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(CIRI) Human Rights Data Project,32 these are partly based on reports by Amnesty
International.33 This is problematic, as Amnesty’s reports are not methodologically
consistent or reliable, as discussed below.
III. EXAMINING HRW’S AND AMNESTY’S MIDDLE EAST PRIORITIES: 2005-2010
¶24

In examining HRW’s relative emphases within the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) division, two quantitative indicators were selected: 1) the number of press
releases, letters, and commentaries produced for each country in the years 2005-2010;
and 2) the number and number of pages of major reports and briefings published on each
country (Table 2A). Due to the high resource commitment required for major reports and
the value assigned to them by HRW, as often reflected in accompanying press
conferences and publicity campaigns, these documents are a significant indicator of the
relative priority assigned to each country. Amnesty’s emphasis was also measured by two
quantitative indicators: 1) the number of press releases, reports, letters and other
documents produced for each country in the years 2005-2010; and 2) the number of
urgent action items released on each country. Urgent action items were reflective of
Amnesty’s priority for advocacy in each country.
¶25
Tables 1A and 1B list the number of documents and reports published by HRW and
the number of documents and urgent action items from Amnesty in the years 2005-2010.
In comparison, we list the scores given by Freedom House to each country in the same
period (where lower score indicates a freer or more open society):

32

David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.humanrightsdata.org.
33 For a survey of the methodological problems in translating PTS and CIRI data, see Emilie M. HafnerBurton & James Ron, Seeing Double, 61 WORLD POLITICS 360, 377-379 (2009).
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Table 1A: HRW Publication Ranking vs. Freedom House Scores34
Press releases etc, 2005HRW Number of Freedom House Score
10 (Excluding Reports)
Reports 20052005-2010
2010
40
1
66

Algeria

47

1

62

Bahrain

163

11

66

Egypt

219

10

72

Iran

149

19

69

Iraq

259

20

Israel 18

98

7

59

Israel and
The OT
Jordan

29

1

50

Kuwait

106

7

52

Lebanon

84

6

84

Libya

74

5

54

Morocco

4

0

66

Oman

4

0

68

Qatar

142

9

78

85

4

79

Saudi
Arabia
Syria

69

4

70

Tunisia

41

3

67

UAE

50

6

62

Yemen

Palestine35
67.5

Country

34

Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2011, FREEDOM HOUSE (2012),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIWAllScoresCountries1973-2011.xls;
Middle East/North Africa Reports 2005-2010, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/byissue/publications/11?date_f ilter%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=2010; Middle East/North Africa News
Releases 2005-2010, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/by-issue/newsfilter/11?date_filter%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=2010.
35 Prior to 2010, Freedom House (FH) distinguished between the Palestinian Administered Territories and
the Israeli Occupied Territories. For this period, we combined the scores, and divided by two to arrive at an
average score. From 2010, FH distinguish between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The average score was
used for 2010. The data for the Palestinian Territories is available at Freedom in the World, FREEDOM
HOUSE (2012),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIWAllScoresTerritories1973-2011.xls.
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Table 1B: Amnesty Publication Ranking vs. Freedom House Scores36
Amnesty
Amnesty Press
Freedom House Score
Country
Urgent Action releases etc, 20052005-2010
Items
2010
2005-2010
28
85
66
Algeria

¶26

20

38

62

Bahrain

51

174

66

Egypt

570

408

72

Iran

78

233

69

Iraq

90

350

Israel 18

1

58

59

Jordan

14

13

50

Kuwait

10

119

52

Lebanon

15

48

84

Libya

13

121

54

Morocco

8

1

66

Oman

6

9

68

Qatar

115

52

78

Saudi Arabia

175

129

79

Syria

38

121

70

Tunisia

25

26

67

UAE

65

49

62

Yemen

Palestine37
67.5

Israel and the OT

While Libya received the worst rating in the region from Freedom House, it was
only eighth in terms of HRW’s agenda, as reflected in the number of documents
produced during the 2005-2010 period. Amnesty gave Libya an even lower priority in its
agenda, thirteenth in terms of documents (excluding urgent action items) produced during
the period, and twelfth in the number of urgent action items. Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen
36

Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2011, FREEDOM HOUSE (2012)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIWAllScoresCountries1973-2011.xls;
Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/israel-occupied-palestinian-territories?page=14.
37 Id.
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received marginally less attention from HRW in this period, and also received very low
ratings from Freedom House. As shown in this table, in general, there is an inverse
correlation between the openness of a society (as measured by Freedom House) and the
degree to which HRW emphasized the country in their publications and related activities.
¶27
In contrast, Amnesty’s urgent action items show a closer correlation with Freedom
House’s scores. For example, Syria received the second worst score in the region from
Freedom House and fifth in terms of Amnesty’s overall publications, but second in the
number of urgent action items. The same is true for Saudi Arabia, which ranked third on
the Freedom House index, eleventh in terms of documents produced by Amnesty, but
third in the number of urgent action items from Amnesty. Barring the glaring exceptions
of Israel and Libya (discussed below), the pattern holds true throughout the rankings,
with only minor differences between the Freedom House score and relative distribution
of Amnesty’s urgent action items.
¶28
Libya and Israel stand out as the two poles—Libya, the country with the worst
Freedom House score, is grossly underreported by Amnesty, and Israel, the country with
the best regional Freedom House ranking (even when considered with Palestine), is
grossly over-reported. The very low emphasis given to Libya is particularly surprising
since, as discussed below, both human rights groups sent delegations to the country twice
during the period under examination.
¶29
The inverse correlation can perhaps be explained by the lack of access to closed
societies, preventing effective monitoring by human rights NGOs. 38 However, this
explanation can only partially account for the systematic discrepancy. Beginning with the
outbreak of the Arab uprisings in early 2011, HRW dramatically increased its reports on
the relevant countries. Data from NGO Monitor show that in 2011, HRW’s coverage of
the countries in the region increased significantly in comparison to its 2010 level: Libya
(478%); Egypt (103%), Syria (416%), Bahrain (200%), Yemen (178%) and Tunisia
(78%).39 Such rapid dramatic changes cannot be explained as an instant worsening of
human rights conditions in these countries due to the outbreak of violent conflict, or an
immediate end to the closed structures of the regimes. Rather, the fact that HRW and
other prominent NGOs immediately increased their focus, when access was still very
limited, indicates that this was, at most, a minor factor in explaining the lack of interest
and reporting.40
38

For example, 2009 data shows that the MENA region was the subject of the lowest regional visit total
from Amnesty, and the lowest in terms of work hours related to those missions. Additionally, the region
received the least amount of reports and shorter research documents than any other region. Notably, in
2009, the MENA region generated more urgent action items than any other region. Amnesty explains that
“some countries (e.g., China, Cuba, Iran, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Vietnam) prohibit our entry to
investigate human rights violations; others make entry for research purpose either rare or extremely
difficult (e.g., India, Libya, Syria); and, in respect to some countries our research methodologies mean it is
simply too unsafe to enter, both for our contacts in those countries and for our staff.” 2010 Report to INGO
Accountability Charter, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 64 (2010),
http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/AI-2010-Report-to-INGOAccountability-Charter-GRI-NGO-Level-C-v09.pdf.
39 HRW in 2011: More Balance, Less Credibility, NGO Monitor (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.ngomonitor.org/article/hrw_in_more_balance_less_credibility.
40 Similarly, see Howard Ramos, James Ron & Oskar N.T. Thomas, Shaping the Northern Media’s Human
Rights Coverage, 1986-2000, 44 J. PEACE RESEARCH, 385, 395-96 (2007),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640537 (analyzing the relationship between the size of civil society and
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It attempting to explain why Amnesty’s urgent actions had a higher correlation to
Freedom House than their research publications and reports, one possible explanation is
that the correlation reflects the reactive and internal nature of urgent actions. These are
used by Amnesty tool to mobilize their members in response to a perceived immediate
threat to human rights. As such, urgent actions do not reflect long-term resource
allocations, but rather low-cost and real time responses. The lack of a strong correlation
between Amnesty’s research documents and their urgent actions also demonstrates the
lack of coordination between their publication agenda (such as research reports) and
immediate advocacy issues.
IV. ANALYSIS OF HRW AND AMNESTY’S RESEARCH PRIORITIES

¶31

Tables 2A and 2B compare the number of country reports that HRW (Table 2A)
and Amnesty (Table 2B) published during the period 2005-2010. As the two NGOs do
not use the same categories for their publications, these distinctions must be taken into
account in the analysis. HRW’s website marks documents as “reports” only when they
are major research-intensive publications. Due to significant resources needed to produce
these reports, they are good indicator of priorities.
¶32
Amnesty’s definition of “reports” is different from that of HRW, and includes
documents such as press releases and even urgent action items. Similar documents (and
on occasion the same document, listed twice) are sometimes marked as “stories” or
“press releases” without significant differences. Therefore, in comparing Amnesty’s
publications by country to HRW’s, we counted as “reports” only documents similar to
HRW’s classification, meaning long and detailed research publications, which include
recommendations. Short documents (fewer than five pages) were not included, with the
exception of a few documents with the distinctive appearance characteristic of Amnesty’s
larger reports, including front and back covers, and distinctive titles. Similarly, short
Amnesty “reports” addressed to members via newsletters, were excluded from the total,
due to the limited resources required. In addition, Amnesty’s submissions to UN agencies
were also excluded from the number of reports.

media human rights reporting). The Ramos, Ron & Thomas analysis revealed only “qualified empirical
support” for the claim that increased civil society increases human rights reporting. Id.
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Table 2A: HRW Reports (Pages) Per Country 2005
2005-2010

Table 2A:
A: HRW Reports (Pages) Per Country
2005-2010
1903

1045
701

641

616

465
234
19

89

218 227
97

217 190 167
0

329

0

Table 2B: Amnesty Reports (Pages) Per Country 2005-2010

¶33

As can be seen in Table 2A and 2B, HRW
HRW’s and Amnesty’ss reports on Libya,
Syria, Tunisia and Yemen in this period of closed regimes were consistently short,
supporting the premise that these NGOs assigned a low priority and devoted very limited
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resources to documenting and publicizing abuses in these countries. Interestingly, in
countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, which scored high in the number of
urgent action items, there is no corresponding emphasis on other publications as
measured by the total number of pages.
¶34
In Syria, for example, HRW’s July 2010 report reviewing a decade of human rights
abuses by the Assad regime resulted in a slim thirty-five-page publication titled “A
Wasted Decade.”41 This was only HRW’s fourth major country report on Syria published
since 2000. HRW’s 2010 report of five years of rule by King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia42
was also minimal, consisting of a mere fifty-two pages.
¶35
While HRW placed some emphasis on Saudi Arabia, as shown in Table 2A (616
pages of reports between 2005 and 2010), these were sporadic and limited to nine
documents, in contrast to the 5 reports in the period of March-August 2009 alone
focusing on the Gaza war (December 2008 to January 2009).43 From 2005 to 2008, the
NGO did not publish specific reports on Saudi Arabia at all, in part reflecting the
difficulties of gaining access (see below on the issue of access and priorities).44 After
being allowed to enter the country, the subject that received the most attention from
HRW was the discrimination against various sectors in Saudi society—foreign workers,45
minorities,46 and women,47 as well as criticism of the justice system.48
¶36
In analyzing Amnesty’s priorities, we note that Iran received a relatively large
share of attention, but, as in the case of HRW and Saudi Arabia, this was also sporadic.
Beyond reporting on the issues related to the death penalty, as part of Amnesty’s global
“abolitionist” campaign on the issue,49 much of other reporting was related to the protests
which followed the Iranian elections of 2009, known as the “Green Revolution”, when
media interest in Iran was at its peak.50
41

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A WASTED DECADE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN SYRIA DURING BASHAR AL-ASAD’S
FIRST TEN YEARS IN POWER (2010),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0710webwcover.pdf.
42 HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, LOOSER REIN, UNCERTAIN GAIN: A HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF FIVE
YEARS OF KING ABDULLAH’S REFORMS IN SAUDI ARABIA (2010),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudi0910webwcover.pdf.
43 HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, RAIN OF FIRE: ISRAEL’S UNLAWFUL USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS IN GAZA
(2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0309web.pdf.
44 Christoph Wilcke Profile, THE GUARDIAN,
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/christoph_wilcke/profile.html.
45 HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, “AS IF I AM NOT HUMAN”: ABUSES AGAINST ASIAN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN
SAUDI ARABIA (2008), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0708_1.pdf.
46 Denied Dignity: Systematic Discrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Sept. 2008), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudi0909web.pdf.
47 Perpetual Minors: Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in
Saudi Arabia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0408_1.pdf.
48 Precarious Justice: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair Trials in the Deficient Criminal Justice System of
Saudi Arabia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudijustice0308_1.pdf.
49 See, e.g., Iran: End Executions by Stoning, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 2008),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/001/2008/en/81d4eda6-2e67-4f69-844d5a1a60dba9a7/mde130012008en.pdf.
50 See, e.g., From Protest to Prison: Iran One Year after the Election, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Jun.
2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/062/2010/en/a009a855-788b-4ed4-8aa93e535ea9606a/mde130622010en.pdf.
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But these are minor exceptions to the general pattern. The inverse correlation
between the Freedom House rankings and HRW’s agenda and priorities, as reflected in
the publication record, suggest that the level of openness of a society is not a determining
variable in the allocation of resources by HRW.
V. HRW’S EXPLANATIONS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION

¶38

One effort to justify HRW’s prioritization is posted on the organization’s website:
[w]e try to strike a balance between working in countries where the most
atrocious human rights violations occur and those where we can bring
about the most change. In assessing trouble spots, we take into
consideration the severity of the crimes being committed, the numbers of
those affected, and our potential to have impact.51

¶39

This statement specifies two criteria for prioritization by HRW—the level of
human rights violations and the perceived capability of HRW to exert an influence.
HRW’s 2011 World Report offers additional criteria for their resource allocations:
¶40
The factors we considered in determining the focus of our work in 2010 (and hence
the content of this volume) include the number of people affected and the severity of
abuse, access to the country and the availability of information about it, the susceptibility
of abusive forces to influence, and the importance of addressing certain thematic
concerns and of reinforcing the work of local rights organizations.52
¶41
A similar statement appears in almost all HRW World Reports. The World Reports
actually present five separate criteria for deciding how global priorities are assigned, at
least in theory, by HRW:






Number of people affected and the severity of abuse.
Access to the country and the availability of information about it.
The susceptibility of abusive forces to influence.
The importance of addressing certain thematic concerns.
Reinforcing the work of local rights organizations.53

¶42

Of these five criteria, only the first can be attributed to core human rights concerns
and principles. The others reflect the ease or difficulty of collecting data, HRW’s
potential impact, and relations with other NGOs.
¶43
An entirely different explanation for HRW’s departure from the universal
foundations of human rights and for failing to focus on the worst abusers was offered by
Tom Malinowski, HRW’s Washington advocacy director, in testimony delivered in 2007
before a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives:

51

Frequently Asked Questions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75138#5.
World Report 2011: Events of 2010, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2011),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2011.pdf.
53 Id.

52
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There is a concern that speaking too loudly about issues like women’s
rights and religious freedom in Saudi Arabia could backfire, causing these
issues to be perceived as exclusively Western attacks against a pristine
Islamic culture. Care indeed needs to be taken in choosing how to speak to
Saudis about human rights.54
¶44

In a 2009 op-ed in the New York Times, Robert Bernstein, who founded HRW in
1978 and remains its founding Chairman Emeritus, strongly criticized this and other
attempts to justify HRW’s priorities:
[a]t Human Rights Watch, we always recognized that open, democratic
societies have faults and commit abuses . . . When I stepped aside in 1998,
Human Rights Watch was active in 70 countries, most of them closed
societies. Now the organization, with increasing frequency, casts aside its
important distinction between open and closed societies.55

¶45

Speaking at the University of Nebraska, Bernstein added:
[t]he faults of democratic countries were much less of a priority not
because there were no faults, obviously, but because they had so many
indigenous human rights groups and other organizations openly criticizing
them. . . . The organization . . . was founded to go after what I guess you
would call “high-hanging fruit”—that is, closed societies, where it is hard
to get in.56

¶46

Yet another explanation for HRW’s lack of emphasis on developing an
infrastructure to support human rights in Arab countries is examined in research
published by James Ron and Howard Ramos on the correlation between international
media coverage of different regions and allocation of NGO resources. They conclude that
[c]ountries already covered by the media” consistently received more
attention from NGOs. In contrast, areas and conflicts characterized by a
high level of human rights violations but receive little or no media

54

Is There a Human Rights Double Standard?: U.S. Policy Toward Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Uzbekistan:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
110th Cong. 17-18 (2007), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg36062/pdf/CHRG110hhrg36062.pdf (statement of Tom Malinowski, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch).
55 Robert L. Bernstein, Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20bernstein.html?_r=0&adxnnlx=1326636150McWEM4/qtZfHJauWU4ezMg&pagewanted=print.
56 Robert L. Bernstein, Human Rights in the Middle East, The Shirley and Leonard Goldstein Lecture on
Human Rights, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA (Nov. 10, 2010)
http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=1317489&ct=8884881&prin
tmode=1.
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attention, such as Central Africa and North Africa (until 2011) are
generally ignored.57
¶47

Similarly, an HRW board member explained the disproportionate focus on Israel:
“We seek the limelight—that’s part of what we do. And so, Israel’s sort of like lowhanging fruit.”58 Based on these statements and the data reflecting the actual focus of
HRW’s MENA division, the relatively minimal level of activities in the closed
dictatorships for many years reflected HRWs assessment that their reports on those
countries would have received little media interest.
¶48
The phrase “low hanging fruit” also refers to the easy cases in which information
is readily obtained, although the actual policy impacts (as distinct from the public
relations claims) will be minimal because of the overall conditions of openness,
democracy and rule of law. Additionally, there is no physical or other risk to NGO
employees in open countries where they can travel widely and publish allegations of
abuses and suffer no penalties for errors, no matter how egregious. Emily Williams, an
American NGO official in the West Bank, examined the reason for the “proliferation of
NGOs” dealing with Israel and the Palestinians:
[p]eople need field experience and Palestine sounds cool and dangerous
because it can be described as a war zone, but in reality it’s quite safe and
has all the comforts that internationals want. Quality of life here is so
much higher than somewhere like Afghanistan, but we don’t tell anyone
so that we are not replaced or reassigned.59
¶49

There is no evidence that this proliferation of NGOs in relatively accessible and
safe areas has a “spill-over effect” in the sense of using the impact in the easy cases as a
springboard for reforms in the more difficult and closed countries. The introduction of
new legal procedures for terror suspects in Canada or Israel, for example, has no visible
impact on the lack of due process in the many dictatorships and closed societies in the
Middle East.
¶50
The centrality of media interest in explaining HRW’s priorities and agenda has
been explained by researchers and analysts as a business strategy, in the sense that NGOs
use the press coverage and publicity to leverage increased donor funding.60 Heins has
documented the ways in which NGOs working in Afghanistan, Bosnia and other areas
actively competed for funding by demonstrating that they were “supplying the goods”

57

James Ron & Howard Ramos, Why Are the United States and Israel at the Top of Human Rights Hit
Lists?, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/03/are_human_rights_groups_biased.
58 Ben Birnbaum, Minority Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.tnr.com/article/minority-report-2?page=0,0.
59 Kieron Monks, Why Your Streets Are Full of Foreigners, THIS WEEK IN PALESTINE (Apr. 2011),
http://thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=3385&ed=193&edid=193; see also, Patrizia Schlosser,
Party-Feeling im Krisengebiet: Disco Ramallah, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/jobundberuf/party-feeling-im-krisengebiet-disco-ramallah-a-806718.html.
60 Ramos, supra note 40, at 398-99.
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regarding the issues at the center of media interest.61 Similarly, the conclusions of a study
published by Ramos and others are reinforced by numerous examples of publicity-driven
NGO activities designed to attract donors.62 For example, in the recent case of conflict in
Mali, a reporter notes that the “director of one large NGO told me—himself critical of the
response by agencies—“NGOs prefer to work in refugee camps where there is donor
interest and NGOs can achieve visibility.”63 This visibility takes the form of “ample
photo opportunities with which to impress donors.”64
The links between publicity, donor relations and NGO priorities are documented in
detail by Linda Polman in The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?
According to Polman, “funding levels rise with the incidence of violence and media
interest,”65 and NGO officials are aware of this and arrive at disaster areas with “camera
teams and photographers, so that their backers could see them.”66
NGOs also set their priorities and agenda in order to obtain media coverage to
enhance their own credibility. Caroll Bogert, an HRW official, acknowledges that,
“Media coverage can also act as an informal ‘stamp of approval’ for international
advocacy groups. When a prominent publication cites an NGO official in a story, it
signifies that the reporter, who is supposed to be knowledgeable about the issue, has
determined the NGO to be credible.”67 This media exposure, in turn, also means that the
NGO is seen to “carry greater weight with the policymakers.”68 Hence, NGOs such as
HRW choose to cover stories that are in the media spotlight in order to increase their
credibility and their political capital.
By focusing on countries with high media interest, HRW and the wider NGO
community receive the best return on their investments. According to this theory, NGOs
focus on an issue that is already in highlighted by the media, which further multiplies the
cumulative impact. Ramos and Ron note that, “With few journalists urgently demanding
information about Niger, it made little sense to invest substantial reporting and advocacy
resources there.” 69
This justification is problematic, both on normative and policy grounds. In
principle, NGOs should not choose to ignore violations of human rights in countries or
regions with low media profiles. The data presented by Ramos and his colleagues on
Amnesty press releases show that such activities can influence media coverage of human

61

VOLKER HEINS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: STRUGGLES OVER
RECOGNITION 34 (2008).
62

Howard Ramos, James Ron & Kathleen Rodgers, What Shapes the West’s Human Rights Focus?, 5
CONTEXTS, 37-38 (2006),
63 Afua Hirsch, The international response to Mali’s crisis has been woefully inadequate, THE GUARDIAN
(July 13, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/13/international-response-maliinadequate.
64 Id.
65 Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? 157 (2010).
66 Id. at 68.
67 Carroll Bogert, Whose News? The Changing Media Landscape and NGOs, in, Human Rights Watch,
World Report 2011 25 (Joe Saunders et al. eds., 2011).
68 Id. at 26.
69 James Ron & Howard Ramos, Why Are the United States and Israel at the Top of Human Rights Hit
Lists? FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/03/are_
human_rights_groups_biased.
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rights abuses,70 but the impact is significantly greater when NGOs focus on areas and
issues that receive relatively little media attention.71 They conclude that “the findings also
warn that NGOs should think carefully about flocking to media hotspots, since their voice
appears to get lost in the multitude.”72 It is arguable that if NGOs like HRW and Amnesty
International had issued reports and held press conferences highlighting human rights
abuses in Libya or Syria, media attention might have focused on those countries, leading
to international pressure and significant changes to in-country behavior.
¶55
The wider impact of NGO campaigns, whether through the media or other forms of
pressure, is subject to debate. Franklin, for example, has shown that NGO “naming and
shaming” in Latin America was effective in forcing changes in regime behavior, but only
for a short period of time.73 Burton’s research, covering a number of regions, has found
that naming and shaming was only partly effective in that “[g]overnments put in the
global spotlight for violations often adopt better protections for political rights afterward,
but they rarely stop or appear to lessen acts of terror.”74 Wright and Escribà-Folch
research suggests that naming and shaming may be more effective in personal
authoritarian regimes than in non-personal authoritarian systems.75 In the Middle East,
this analysis suggests that “naming and shaming” was particularly suited to Libya, Syria,
and Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
¶56
A third explanation for the selection of particular targets for attention by global
human rights organizations is based on ideological factors, particularly the impact of
post-colonial ideology,76 whose adherents seek to redress the impact of Western
imperialism and capitalism on non-European societies.77 The centrality of post-colonial
ideology in the NGO sphere is reflected in the language of reports and campaigns, which
often demonstrate strong support for the pre-defined “victims” of colonialism and neocolonialism. Thus, the leaders of broadly-defined “victim societies,” such as Arabs,
Africans, and other members of the “Global South,” are not examined with the same
human rights expectations and norms as those applied to American and European
governments and leaders. A former HRW staffer pointedly reported that “[w]hen [I]
reported on Georgia, [my] firm feeling was [I] could report whatever [I] wanted . . . when
[I] was talking to headquarters, the feeling was, let the chips fall where they may. [I] did
not feel that way dealing with the Middle East division.”78 In examining HRW’s agenda

70

Ramos, supra note 40, at 401.
Id.
72 Id. Their final conclusion is that NGOs should split their resources between “central and peripheral”
countries, both to enhance their visibility and to attain the most impact.
73 James C. Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in
Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187, 207-08 (2008).
74 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement
Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 707 (2008).
75 Joseph G. Wright & Abel Escribà-Folch, Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?, 25 IBEI
WORKING PAPERS 3, 6 (2009), http://www.ibei.org/images/stories/papers/WP_IBEI_25.pdf.
76 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
77 Postcolonial theory and the Arab-Israel conflict 4-5 (Phillip Carl Salzman & Donna Robinson Divine
eds., 2008).
78 Ben Birnbaum, Minority Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/minority-report-2#.
71
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in the Middle East, the impact of this ideological framework manifested itself in the
consistently lower emphasis on closed dictatorial regimes until the revolutions of 2011.79
¶57
The impact of ideology on HRW’s priorities is illustrated not only in the sharp
contrast between the emphasis on Israel (after 1967, no longer considered to be a
“victim” of colonialism) and most of the other MENA countries, but also in the contrast
between MENA and other regional divisions of HRW.
VI. THE STRANGE CASE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HRW AND LIBYA
¶58

As noted above, one of the explanations offered for neglecting Arab dictatorships is
that the avoidance of friction allows for quiet cooperation with the regime to human
rights practices. In this section we will examine Amnesty International’s and HRW’s
interactions with the Gaddafi regime, and the efforts to justify these cooperative
relationships based on this prism.
¶59
After seizing power in 1969, the regime headed by Moammar Gaddafi became one
of the most virulent and consistent violators of human rights and a major source of
international terror.80 Throughout this period, Libya was a very closed society and an
extreme police state81 with one of the worst human rights records. Gaddafi was linked to
major terror attacks, including planting an explosive on Pan Am flight 103, which
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, murdering 270 people.82
¶60 However, in 2003, following the US-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Libya
agreed to end efforts to acquire nuclear weapons technology and renounced terrorism. In
return, the US, UK, and other European governments, as well as the Western media,
began to embrace Gaddafi. This support increased further after Libya accepted
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombings.83 As a result, the Gaddafi totalitarian regime
began to receive positive media coverage. HRW and Amnesty, as well as other NGOs,
played a major part in this process, voicing criticism of human rights abuses while
reinforcing the image of Libya as undergoing a positive transformation.
¶61
As part of this strategy, the regime sought to improve its image as a major human
rights abuser. In December 1998, the Gaddafi International Charity and Development
Foundation (“GDF”) was founded, headed by Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.84 Thorough the
Foundation, Saif al-Islam actively sought interaction with international human rights
NGOs, and in 2004, he invited Amnesty International to send a delegation to Libya. This

79

Examining Human Rights Watch in 2008: Double Standards and Post-Colonial Ideology, NGO
MONITOR (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.ngomonitor.org/data/images/File/HRW_Annual_Report_2008_Appendix.pdf.
80 U.S. Relations with Libya, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm.
81 Worst of the Worst 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, FREEDOM HOUSE 17 (2011),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/WorstOfTheWorst2011.pdf.
82 1988: Jumbo jet crashes onto Lockerbie, BBC (Dec. 21, 1988),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/21/newsid_2539000/2539447.stm.
83 Felicity Barringer, Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/international/middleeast/16NATI.html.
84 Libya: Time to Make Human Rights a Reality, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 27, 2004),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2004/en/0f0c0416-d631-11dd-ab95a13b602c0642/mde190022004en.pdf.
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was Amnesty’s first official site visit to Libya in fifteen years. 85 Amnesty subsequently
published a harsh report on the state of Libyan human rights. However the report also
praised the GDF:
[w]hile it continues to be virtually impossible for independent human
rights organizations to develop in Libya, there has been limited progress
with regard to allowing work on human rights violations in the country.
Since its establishment in December 1998, the Human Rights Society of
the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, presided
over by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, one of Colonel al-Gaddafi’s sons, has
become increasingly active in the field of human rights.86
¶62

Similarly, HRW sent a delegation to Libya in 2005—the organization’s first such
visit to the country. Prior to 2005, reports on Libya were very limited—the organization
issued only eight press releases about Libya from 2000-2005, almost all dealing with
Libya’s selection for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The subsequent report of
HRW’s visit, while critical of Libya, noted that “a picture emerged of a country
undergoing gradual change after years of strict repression and global isolation.”87 HRW’s
2006 World Report, (covering the year 2005) stated,
[t]wo human rights groups exist in Libya, most prominently the human
rights program at the Qaddafi International Foundation for Charity
Associations, run by Muammar Qaddafi’s influential son Seif. In 2005, the
foundation ran campaigns against torture and called for the release of
political prisoners. A quasi-official institution, it is also the most vocal
domestic critic of the government.88

¶63

Similar language appears in subsequent HRW World Reports, including the 2011
edition, published days before the beginning of the Libyan uprising89.
¶64
Despite the positive publicity that Saif Al-Islam received from Amnesty and HRW,
in October 2007, he attacked Amnesty as “trying to weaken Libya by following a
political agenda.”90 The specific trigger to Saif’s attack is not clear; it is possible that this
was partially caused by Amnesty’s submission in September to the United Nation Human
Rights Committee, casting doubt as to whether newspapers owned by Saif could be

85

Id. at 9.
Id, at 8.
87 Libya: Words to Deeds: The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform, HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH 1 (Jan. 25,
2006), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43fb19d64.html.
88 HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH WORLD REPORT 2006 467 (Joe Saunders et al. eds.,
2006), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2006.pdf.
89 HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH WORLD REPORT 2011 (2011),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/wr2011.pdf.
90 Isabelle Werenfels, Qadhafi’s Libya: Infinitely Stable and Reform-Resistant?, 5 SWP RESEARCH
PAPER 5, 28 (2008), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2008_RP05_
wrf_ks.pdf.
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considered independent of the regime.91 In 2009, both Amnesty92 and HRW93 were again
invited to Libya by the Gaddafi Foundation. Both organizations published reports critical
of the Libyan regime, but with major differences in tone this time. Amnesty expressed
caution and skepticism with regards to Saif al-Islam’s role:
[s]ome political commentators on Libya have identified a struggle
between reformist elements, exemplified by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, and
reactionary forces resisting change. Others, more cynical, believe that the
struggle has been fabricated to gain popularity for Saif al-Islam al Gaddafi
at home and legitimacy abroad.94
¶65

Additionally, while Amnesty’s report quoted the GDF claims and statistics widely,
it also cast doubt on the validity of some of the claims of the GDF. 95 Subsequently, in
2010, Amnesty was refused permission to visit Libya.96
¶66
In contrast, HRW’s 2009 reports and related publications strongly embraced the
GDF. In May 2009, HRW MENA director Sarah Leah Whitson authored an article in the
influential US-based Foreign Policy, entitled “Tripoli Spring,” subtitled “How Libya’s
behind-the-scenes reformer is actually, well, reforming.”97 Whitson’s praise of the GDF
was unequivocal: “the real impetus for the transformation rests squarely with a quasigovernmental organization, the Qaddafi Foundation for International Charities and
Development.”98 On December 12, 2009, HRW held what was presented as a news
conference in Libya (although there is no evidence that journalists were free to pose
questions) in order to present their report. A leaked U.S State Department memo noted
that this singular event helped to “solidify Saif al-Islam’s reputation as a ‘reformer.’”99
According to reports, the event ended in pandemonium.100
¶67
In addition, following the press conference, two op-eds written by HRW officials
were published in the Guardian and in an Institute for Policy Studies publication. The
91
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http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/007/2010/en/65e2d9ca-3b76-4ea8-968f5d76e1591b9c/mde190072010en.pdf.
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first was titled “Is Libya Opening Up?,”101 and the second, written by Whitson, was
entitled “Postcard from . . . Tripoli.”102 Whitson’s article linked and embraced a report by
the GDF. Parallel to these developments, in 2009, Saif Al-Islam launched another human
rights organization, The Arab Alliance for Democracy, Development and Human Rights
(“AADDHR”), whose mandate ostensibly consisted of tracking human rights abuses in
the Middle East.103 At the launch of the AADDHR, the organization announced that it
had consulted with “Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about how to be an
effective human rights organization . . .”104 It is unclear whether the organizations were
paid by AADDHR or the Qaddafi regime for the consultation or if the consultation
resulted in any substantive policies.105
¶68
This framework was very short-lived, however, and on December 16, 2010 Saif
announced that he “will no longer be involved in promoting human rights and political
change in the North African country.”106 This announcement was reported in Amnesty’s
2011 Annual Report,107 but notably was not reported by HRW (including in their 2011
World Report, published in January 2011).
¶69
HRW’s influence in promoting Saif al-Islam as a reformer is further reflected in
both the US State Department cable, quoted above, and in the explanations provided by
officials at the London School of Economics (LSE) regarding the acceptance of a 2009
contribution from the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation to LSE
following the granting of a doctoral degree to Saif al-Islam by the school’s Centre for
Global Governance. On March 3, 2011, LSE established an independent inquiry headed
by former Lord Chief Justice Woolf to investigate links between the Libyan government
and LSE. The Woolf report cited Saif al-Islam’s reputation as a reformer108 though it did
not attribute this directly to HRW or Amnesty. In a different forum, Professor David
Held, Co-Director of LSE Global Governance, sought to justify LSE’s relationship with
Saif al-Islam by citing his “reputation as a reformer” based on HRW’s endorsement and
the related press conference, AADDHR interaction with both Amnesty and HRW, and
Whitson’s Foreign Policy article.109
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This strategy of cooperation was also highlighted in the case of Fathi Eljahmi, a
prominent Libyan dissident, who was imprisoned in 2004, tortured, held in solitary
confinement, and subsequently died in 2009 (during the visit of another Amnesty
delegation to the country). His brother condemned HRW for hesitating “to advocate
publicly for Fathi’s case” which he felt was because HRW wanted to avoid “antagonizing
Gaddafi.”110
¶71
HRW continued to promote Saif al-Islam as late as January 24, 2011. In its 2011
World Report, HRW repeated the claim that “[t]he only organization able to criticize
human rights violations publicly is the Human Rights Society of the Gaddafi Foundation,
which is chaired by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi.” 111 This positive evaluation continued
despite the Gaddafi Foundation’s announcement that it would no longer report on human
rights issues, as noted above. Less than a month later, and only after the outbreak of
fighting in the revolt against the Libyan regime, Whitson acknowledged that
Saif Islam in fact abandoned his nascent reform agenda long before the
past week’s demonstrations rocked ‘Brother Leader’ Moammar Kadafi’s
rule . . . Saif Islam last year announced his withdrawal from political life
and said that his foundation would no longer focus on human rights and
political affairs.112
VII. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
¶72

An October 2011 HRW press release, in an understated tone, declared that
“Western governments’ apparent eagerness to embrace Gaddafi for his support on
counterterrorism, as well as lucrative business opportunities, tempered their criticism of
his human rights record in recent years.”113 This belated recognition erases the evidence,
presented above, that HRW and, to a lesser degree, Amnesty, had potentially contributed
to this outcome. Furthermore, it ignores the strong possibility that Amnesty and HRW’s
eagerness to interact with the Gaddafi regime also tempered their criticism of Gaddafi’s
regime.
¶73
In participating in Gaddafi’s political and media campaigns, these NGOs
compromised their own human rights agendas, including in their failure to speak out or
organize campaigns against the execution of Fathi Eljahmi. Human Rights Watch
researcher Heba Morayef explained and tried to justify this strategy of cooperation: “[w]e
also realized that Saif al-Islam was susceptible to international pressure, that he was a
good target for us as a human rights organization within the Libyan authorities because of
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his direct access to his father.”114 When choosing to cultivate links with Saif al-Islam,
HRW and Amnesty created a relationship that limited their ability to effectively criticize
the regime. This reliance on Saif al-Islam in order to gain some access to Libya, as well
as on the GDF for information used in their publications, came at a very high price in
terms of moral principles that these human rights organizations claim to promote.
During more than six years of cooperation (2005 through early 2011), there is little
evidence that HRW or Amnesty’s activities led to an improved human rights environment
or practice in Libya. As the case of the LSE demonstrates, HRW in particular promoted
and reinforced the image of Saif al-Islam and his father as reformers, and shielded the
regime from ongoing pressure and scrutiny.
The statistical analysis of HRW’s Middle East agenda is a clear example of a
consistent pattern in which human rights groups chose not to give priority to promoting
human rights in closed Arab regimes. In comparison, the data on Amnesty publications
shows that while their member-based advocacy campaigns were largely focused on
closed societies, this emphasis was not apparent in the press releases and reports aimed at
the elite opinion makers, including journalists, diplomats and others. In addition, the
statistical analysis shows that both HRW and Amnesty underreported on Libya—despite
official visits to Libya twice during the period under examination. This decision is
partially explained by the analysis, presented above, of HRW’s and Amnesty’s
relationship with the Gaddafi regime. The NGOs made a decision to promote the
dictatorial government, claiming that this would provide access to Libya and encourage
the development of a foundation for human rights. Amnesty’s later caution came too late
to impact the regime. The absence of sustainable human rights support groups in Libya,
Egypt, Syria and other countries involved in the Arab uprisings indicates that this
approach failed.
The lack of focus on closed societies and the interaction with the regimes arguably
contributed to the absence of a normative foundation on which to build when the
revolutions in these countries occurred. The evidence presented clearly indicates that
prior to the unprecedented changes in these societies beginning in 2011, none of the four
objectives specified for NGO networks—agenda setting, creating norms or promoting
policy changes, building networks in the region, and implementing solutions to
“encourage compliance with norms” —were given significant emphasis in this region of
the world.115 This negative outcome reinforces the criticism voiced by HRW’s founder,
Robert Bernstein, and others regarding the failure of the organization to focus on
promoting human rights principles in the closed Arab societies.
Despite its record, HRW is continuing to accommodate some of their agendas and
activities to the Islamist parties and leaders who have become the new wielders of
political power in these countries. This accusation has been voiced by women’s rights
groups. In response to Kenneth Roth’s call for cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood
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in Tunisia and Egypt, 116 the heads of seventeen groups published a highly critical letter.
Addressing Roth, they wrote:
[y]ou are not a state. You are the head of an international human rights
organization whose role is to report on human rights violations, an
honorable and necessary task which your essay largely neglects. You say,
‘It is important to nurture the rights-respecting elements of political Islam
while standing firm against repression in its name,’ but you fail to call for
the most basic guarantee of rights—the separation of religion from the
state. You . . . are so unconcerned with the rights of women, gays, and
religious minorities that you mention them only once, as follows: ‘Many
Islamic parties have indeed embraced disturbing positions that would
subjugate the rights of women and restrict religious, personal, and political
freedoms. But so have many of the autocratic regimes that the West props
up.’ Are we really going to set the bar that low? This is the voice of an
apologist, not a senior human rights advocate.117
¶78

In a separate response to Roth and HRW, Gita Sahgal, who had previously been
Amnesty International’s gender rights unit until she was forced out for criticizing this
organization’s policy of accomodating Moazzam Begg, head of Cageprisoners,118 wrote:
[i]n both his essay and this response, HRW blurs the boundaries between
support for governments and human rights advocacy. The classic work of
human rights organizations is to press governments on human rights
issues, not drum up support for specific regimes.119

¶79

Similarly, Catherine Fitzpatrick, an HRW staff member for ten years, observed that
HRW’s actions in the Middle East are taken
[i]n a highly politicized manner, not recognizing the essential ‘political’
act of picking and choosing cases and priorities, and engaging with or
rejecting this or that regime. Human rights are universal and this
universality dictates that all countries be equally subject to scrutiny . . .
human rights groups would do better to ‘go where the violations are’
instead of endlessly balancing the saddle bags—which in the case of HRW
has often meant especially focusing on Israel because it can . . . 120
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¶80

In light of this pattern of behavior, it is important that these NGOs and the wider
global human rights network, including United Nations structures, be subject to
systematic and autonomous examinations of, and systematic reports on, their priorities,
publications and related activities. The statistical methodology employed in this paper,
which applied independent and consistent measures of state behavior (the Freedom
Foundation index) to assess the allocation of resources and agendas of HRW and
Amnesty in the Middle East, is a demonstration of this approach. In future analyses,
different indices comparing the degree of openness, democracy and human rights across
countries can be devised and applied, as can various measures of NGO priorities and their
impacts.
¶81
In addition, appropriate evaluation procedures regarding the activities and agendas
of human rights NGOs themselves are also needed in order to identify the successful
efforts, as well as the mistakes, as clearly demonstrated in the case of cooperation with
the Gaddafi regime. Organizations that promote moral agendas such as human rights
have the responsibility to acknowledge and accept responsibility for actions that are
inconsistent with the principles that they claim to espouse.
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